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Abstract. We study the existence and the characterization of function transform-
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1 Introduction
The last years have seen a considerable growth in the amount of software that is dis-
tributed over the Internet and in the amount of wireless devices that dominate our soci-
ety. Common classes of web applications that are part of our daily lives include e-mail
clients, e-banking, e-commerce, social shopping, social networks and e-voting. In this
complex scenario users need to protect their devices against malicious software attacks
(e.g., software viruses and internet worms), while software developers need to protect
their products against malicious host attacks that usually aim at stealing, modifying or
tampering with the code in order to obtain (economic) advantages over it. In this work
we consider the today challenges in protecting software against malicious host attacks.
The security scenario. A key challenge in defending code that is running on an un-
trusted host is that there is no limit on the techniques that the host can use to extract
sensitive data from the code and to violate its intellectual property and integrity. Indeed,
software developers lose the control of their applications once they are distributed to a
client machine. The most common malicious host attacks against proprietary programs
are malicious reverse-engineering, software piracy and software tampering. Malicious
reverse engineering refers to those techniques that aim at inspecting the inner work-
ings of software applications and then to use the so extracted information for unlawful
purposes. Both software tampering and software piracy need a preliminary reverse-
engineering phase in order to understand the inner working of the program that they
want to tamper with or to use unauthorized. Thus, the first defense against malicious
host attacks consists in impeding reverse engineering as much as possible. In this work
we focus on code obfuscation, one of the most promising software solutions for code
protection. Code obfuscation [3] is a program transformation that aims at transforming
programs in order to make them more difficult to analyze while revealing their func-
tionality. Besides the negative result of Barak et al. [2], that states the impossibility of
an “ideal” obfuscation that obfuscates every program by revealing only the properties
that can be derived from the I/O semantics, in the last decades we have seen a big effort
in developing and implementing new and efficient obfuscation strategies.
The problem. It is very important to deeply understanding what it is possible to
obfuscate of a program and when it is possible to obfuscate it. We believe that the
development of a systematic strategy for the design of an obfuscator parameterized
with respect to the program properties, both to conceal and to reveal, would be an
important advance in the state of the art. In particular, it would provide a better insight
in the relation between the property revealed by an obfuscator, which usually is the I/O
program behavior but which can be any observable property of the program, and the
property concealed, e.g., the program dependencies, the control structure, and so on.
Our contribution. We propose a general framework of program transformations that
focuses on the semantic properties that a transformation either reveals or conceals of
the program semantics. In this context we study the existence and characterization of
maximal program transformers that maximally transform a program semantics while
keeping (revelation transformer) or losing (concealment transformer) a given property.
We observe that the revelation transformer finds a concrete example in the program
slicing transformation which transforms a program looking for the maximal subpro-
gram preserving the I/O behavior on the criterion variables [16]. On the other hand, the
concealment transformer does not correspond or model any real program (semantics)
transformation since it adds anything that may confuse the property to conceal, poten-
tially losing in this way also the original program behavior. Interestingly, the combina-
tion of these transformers provide a systematic strategy for the design of obfuscating
transformations parametric on the program properties to conceal and reveal.
2 Motivating Scenario: Code obfuscation
Code obfuscation. Following the standard definition of Collberg et al. [3], a code
obfuscation is a potent program transformation tˆ : P→ P that preserves the I/O behav-
ior of programs, where potent means that tˆ makes programs more difficult to analyse.
Indeed, code obfuscation aims at concealing some information, while preserving the
observational behavior of programs (i.e., program denotational semantics) for keeping
them usable. A typical example of code obfuscation is the insertion of fake branches
through opaque predicates [3]. A true (resp. false) opaque predicate is a predicate that
always evaluates to true (resp. false). Program functionality is preserved by inserting
the intended behavior in the always taken branch and buggy code in the never executed
branch. In both cases the constant value of the predicate has to be difficult to deduce for
an external observers that sees both branches as possible.
Semantic code obfuscation. In [8] the informal definition of code obfuscation of Coll-
berg et al. has been generalized and placed in a theoretical framework based on program
semantics and abstract interpretation. The idea is to introduce a formal model of mali-
cious host attacks and of code transformations that allows to rigorously specify in the
abstract interpretation framework the amount of “obscurity” added by a transformation
to program semantics.
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Modeling attackers. In this context, the typical attacker performs reverse-engineering
on programs in order to steal or copy ideas. Automatic reverse-engineering techniques
typically consist in static program analysis (e.g., data flow analysis, control flow analy-
sis, alias analysis, program slicing) and dynamic program analysis (e.g., dynamic test-
ing, profiling, program tracing). Hence, we consider two kind of attacks: one that exe-
cutes the program, collects computational traces, and then analyses these traces looking
for invariants, and the other that statically analyses the code. Thus, dynamic attacks can
extract properties of the execution traces, while static attacks analyse the code looking
for dynamic properties without executing the program. It is well known [5] that static
analysis can be modeled in the context of abstract interpretation, where a property is
extensionally represented as the set of all the data satisfying it and describes the abstrac-
tion of the corresponding data1. In particular, static analysis is performed as an abstract
execution of programs, namely as the (fixpoint) semantics computation on the abstract
data. Instead, dynamic analysis can be modeled as an approximated observation of the
concrete execution since it describes partial knowledge of the real execution.
In the following, we model a property as the function ϕmapping data in the minimal set
satisfying it, hence ϕ is extensive (i.e., ϕ(X) ⊇ X) which means that to approximate
means to add noise, it is idempotent since the whole approximation is added in one shot
and finally it is monotone, preserving the approximation order. Namely it is an upper
closure operator (uco) and the framework beneath is abstract interpretation [4, 5]. For
instance, the property of signs of sets of integers numbers is represented by function
ϕsign : ℘(Z)→ ℘(Z) that associated to every set X ∈ ℘(Z) the set of integers with the
same sign, for example ϕsign({−3,−5}) = {−∞ . . . 0}, while ϕsign({−3, 5}) = Z,
namely we add all the noise in one shot. This formal framework, ensures that with any
set of data we can always associate the best approximation, i.e., the minimal set satis-
fying the property and containing the original set of data. Hence, dynamic analysis can
be seen as an instantiation of static analysis, namely as an approximated/abstracted ob-
servation of the (fixpont) semantic computation on concrete data. More formally, given
the set of possible program states2 Σ, we denote by [[P ]] ∈ ℘(Σ∗) the (concrete) trace
semantics of a program P ∈ P. Thus, malicious host attacks, i.e., static and dynamic
program analysers, are modeled as properties ϕ ∈ uco(℘(Σ∗)) encoding the semantic
features in which the attacker is interested. Simplifying, we can say that static attacks
are modeled by abstracting the computation of the semantics on approximated inputs,
i.e., ϕ ◦ [[P ]] ◦ ϕ3, while dynamic attacks are modeled as (abstract) observations of
concrete executions, i.e., ϕ ◦ [[P ]] .
Syntactic vs semantic transformations. The formal definition of the relation between
syntactic and semantic program transformations given by Cousot and Cousot [6] allows
to reason on the effects that code transformations have on semantics. We consider P
to be the domain of programs up to syntactic equivalence, where two programs P and
Q are syntactically equivalent if [[P ]] = [[Q]], namely if they have the same semantics.
In [6] programs are seen as abstractions of their semantics and this is formalized in
1 For instance, the property of “being negative” is represented by the set of all negative numbers.
2 A state specifies the content of memory and the continuation of the program.
3 ◦ denotes function composition
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the abstract interpretation framework. In particular, the semantic domain 〈℘(Σ∗),⊆〉 is
abstracted in the syntactic domain 〈P,E〉, where E is the order induced on programs,
namely P E Q def= [[P ]] ⊆ [[Q]], the abstraction of X ∈ ℘(Σ∗) is the semantics of the
simplest programP([[X]]) (smallest number of instructions) that upper-approximatesX .
This means that, it is possible to associate to every syntactic program transformation
tˆ : P → P its semantic counterpart t : ℘(Σ∗) → ℘(Σ∗) and vice versa: t([[P ]]) =
[[tˆ(P([[P ]]))]] and tˆ(P ) = P(t([[P ]])). Equation tˆ(P ) = P(t([[P ]])) expresses a syntactic
transformation as an abstraction of the semantic transformation and it allows to derive
a systematic methodology for the design of syntactic transformations from semantic
ones [6]. When the semantic transformation t relies on results of undecidable problems,
any effective algorithm tˆ that tries to implement t would be an approximation of the
ideal transformation P ◦ t ◦ [[·]], namely t([[P ]]) ⊆ [[tˆ(P )]] (equiv. P(t[[P ]]) E tˆ(P[[P ]])).
In the context of code obfuscation, the formal framework of Cousot and Cousot
allows to: (1) model obfuscation potency: reason on the effects that an obfuscation has
on program semantics in order to deeply understand the semantic properties that are
protected, i.e., concealed, by the obfuscation, (2) property-driven obfuscation: given the
semantic properties to protect ϕ and to preserve δ, develop a semantic transformation
that conceals ϕ and reveals δ and uses this semantic characterization as a “measure” of
optimality for any syntactic transformation implementing the corresponding semantic
code obfuscation. Based on the investigation of point (1) presented in [8] we address
here point (2).
From now on we consider the semantic counterpart of code obfuscation, since at the
semantic level we can formally understand what is concealed and what is revealed.
Indeed, studying obfuscation at the semantic level means studying its ideal behavior
that would then be approximated during the implementation process.
Modeling obfuscation potency. Every syntactic transformation tˆ can be precisely mapped
to a semantic transformation t = [[·]] ◦ tˆ ◦ P, where t[[P ]] = [[tˆ(P )]] [6]. In [8] the au-
thors characterize the obfuscating behavior of a program transformation by studying
the effects that it has on program semantics.
Definition 1. [8] A transformation tˆ : P → P is an obfuscation potent w.r.t. all those
semantic properties ϕ ∈ uco(℘(Σ∗)) that are not preserved by tˆ. A property is pre-
served by tˆ iff ∀P ∈ P : ϕ([[P ]]) = ϕ([[tˆ(P )]]).
Hence, the obfuscating behavior of a transformation tˆ : P→ P can be characterized in
terms of the most concrete property δtˆ preserved by tˆ on all programs. It is possible to
systematically derive δtˆ from tˆ [8] and to characterize the properties concealed by tˆ as:
ObfuscatedBy(tˆ) =
{
ϕ ∈ uco(℘(Σ∗)) ∣∣∃X ∈ ℘(Σ∗), δtˆ(X) 6⊆ ϕ(X) }
Indeed, the mapping of code transformations to the lattice of abstract interpretations
allows to measure, reason and compare the potency and efficiency of different obfus-
cating transformations. The idea is that, the more abstract is the most concrete prop-
erty preserved by a transformation, the more potent the transformation is, namely the
bigger is the amount of obscurity added by the transformation. In the following, an
obfuscation for a property ϕ ∈ uco(℘(Σ∗)) is a semantic program transformation
t : ℘(Σ∗)→ ℘(Σ∗) concealing ϕ, i.e., such that ∃P ∈ P : ϕ([[P ]]) 6= ϕ(t([[P ]])).
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original(){
1.int c, nl = 0, nw = 0, nc = 0, in;
2.in = false;
3.while ((c = getchar()) != EOF){
4.nc++;
5.if(c == ‘ ’ || c ==‘\n’ || c == ‘\t’) in = false;





1.int c, nl = 0, nw = 0, nc = 0, in;
2.in = false;
3.while ((c = getchar()) != EOF){
4.nc++;
5.if(c == ‘ ’ || c ==‘\n’ || c == ‘\t’) in = false;
6.elseif(in == false) {in=true; nw++;}
7.if(c == ‘\n’){if(nw <= nc)nl++};
8.if(nl > nc) nw = nc+nl;
9.elseif(nw > nc) nc = nw - nl;
}
10.out(nl,nw,nc); }
Fig. 1. Slicing obfuscation example.
The challenge: property-driven obfuscations. The formal framework described above
[8] allows to compare the potency of different obfuscation transformations and some-
times also their resilience4 [7]. However, this theoretical investigation does not provide
any insight in the design of an efficient obfuscation. Indeed, what is still missing is a
general strategy for designing an obfuscation given the specification of the property ϕ
that it is important to protect, i.e., to conceal, and of the property δ that it is impor-
tant to preserve, i.e., to reveal. This is exactly the high level goal of our investigation.
More specifically, we investigate a general framework of function transformers that aim
at minimally or maximally transform a function in order to reveal or conceal a given
semantic property. To this end, we first model and characterize the minimal transfor-
mations that preserve a certain property, later called revelation, since to preserve means
to leave unchanged and therefore to reveal the property of the original program in the
transformed/obfuscated program. Then we model and characterize the maximal trans-
formation that loses a given property, later called concealment transformers, since to
lose/hide a property of the original program means to change the property and, in this
way, to conceal it. Next we show how the combination of revelation and concealment
can be used for characterizing an obfuscating transformation from the specification of
the property ϕ to be concealed and the property δ to be revealed. What we obtain is the
characterization of the semantic transformation that exhibits the intended obfuscating
behavior. This characterization could then be used to drive the design or to semantically
analyse syntactic code obfuscations that implement the desired semantic behavior.
In the next example we describe the revealed and the concealed properties for a
particular instance of code obfuscation, i.e., slicing obfuscation [15].
Example 1. Consider the word count program in Fig. 1 [15]. It takes in a block of text
and outputs the number of lines (nl), words (nw) and characters (nc). The syntactic
transformation tˆ modifies line 7 by adding a true opaque predicate and adds lines 8 and
9 with false opaque predicates [15], i.e., tˆ(original) = obfuscated.
4 The resilience measures how well a transformation holds up under attack from an automatic
de-obfuscator [3]
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Hence, the above transformation conceals the real data dependences of the program
by adding fake dependences between program variables. Let D be the abstraction ex-
tracting only the (syntactic) dependencies among variables in a program (e.g, by means
of program dependence graphs), then D([[original]]) 6= D([[obfuscated]]), since for in-
stance line 8 adds the dependence of nw from nl. In this way, an external observer is
not able to derive, from the analysis of the obfuscated program, the precise variables
dependences of the original program, overstimating the information. Meanwhile, the
proposed obfuscation reveals/preserves the input-output abstraction I of the program
semantics, i.e., I([[original]]) = I([[obfuscated]]). Namely this information about the
original program can be precisely derived by the observation of its obfuscated version.
Hence, the obfuscation tˆ, while revealing I is potent w.r.t. D.
3 Modeling Revelation
In this section, we study the characterization of function transformers that minimally
modify a function in order to make it reveal a given property. To this end we consider
the complete lattice 〈L,≤,∨,∧,>,⊥〉5 and the complete lattice of functions over L
〈L → L, ≤˙, ∨˙, ∧˙, λx.⊥, λx.>〉, where functions are ordered point-wise, i.e., f≤˙g iff
∀x ∈ L. f(x) ≤ g(x). Given a function f : L → L and a property δ modeled as
abstraction of L, i.e., δ ∈ uco(L)6, we define the two function transformers R↑δ and R↓δ
that aim at computing the two functions closer to f in the domain L→ L, respectively
from above and from below, and that reveal the property δ.
Definition 2 (Minimal revelation). Let δ ∈ uco(L) with L complete lattice. R↑δ ,R↓δ :














g : L→ L ∣∣∀x ∈ L. δ(x) = δ(g(x)), g≤˙f }
It is interesting to study R↑δ(f) and R
↓




δ(f) do not trivially
transform f , i.e., they do not transform f in the top or the bottom of the functional
domain; (**) R↑δ(f) and R
↓
δ(f) reveal the property δ. In order to guarantee that the
transformer always characterizes the minimal obfuscation, R↑δ has to be monotone and
extensive (approximating from above), and it has to be idempotent. Hence, R↑δ has to
be an uco of the lattice L → L, and dually R↓δ has to be a lower closure operator
(lco7). The following result identifies the conditions on the relation between f and δ that
guarantees the condition (*) for the minimal revelation (from above and from below).
Proposition 1. Let L be a complete lattice, f : L→ L and δ ∈ uco(L), we have that
1. R↑δ(f) 6= λx.> iff ∀x ∈ L. δ(f(x)) ≤ δ(x) iff ∃y ≥ f(x). δ(y) = δ(x);
2. R↓δ(f) 6= λx.⊥ iff ∃y ≤ f(x). δ(y) = δ(x);
5 A complete lattice is a partial ordered set with least upper bound and greatest lower bound
existing for each set of elements.
6 The domain uco(L) is the complete lattice of all abstractions of L, modeling properties on L.
7 A function is an lco if it is monotone, reductive (f(x) ≤ x) and idempotent.
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Thus, we can find a non trivial simplification of f revealing δ, iff function f “loses”
something of the property δ of the original element. Analogous for the refinement of f .
The following result proves that R↑δ(f) and R
↓
δ(f) are precisely the minimal transform-
ers inducing the revelation of the property δ, namely they satisfy (**).
Theorem 1. Let L be a complete lattice, f : L → L and δ ∈ uco(L). (1) If δ meet-
uniform8 [11], then R↑δ ∈ uco(L→ L); (2) R↓δ ∈ lco(L→ L).
In this theorem we introduce the notion of uniformity, in particular of meet uniformity
which means that the greatest lower bound (glb) operation preserves the property δ,
namely the glb of elements with same property δ has the same property δ. This precisely
models the fact that we can find the best approximation of x from below sharing the
same property δ of x. Thus, given a function f : L → L, we have that R↑δ(f) returns
the closest function that is greater than f and that reveals the property δ. For this reason,
we refer to R↑δ(f) as the minimal revelation from above of f w.r.t. δ. Dually, we have
that given a function f : L→ L, then R↓δ(f) returns the closest function that is smaller
than f and that reveals the property δ. Analogously, we refer to R↓δ(f) as the minimal
revelation from below of f w.r.t. δ. Given a property δ ∈ uco(L) we define the kernel
of δ with respect to an element x ∈ L as Kδ(x) def=
{
y
∣∣ δ(x) = δ(y) }. Then we use the
shorthand K∧δ (x)
def
= ∧ { y ∣∣ δ(x) = δ(y) }, and K∨δ (x) = ∨{ y ∣∣ δ(x) = δ(y) }. Note
that K∨δ (x) = δ(x) being δ an uco.
Theorem 2. Let L be a complete lattice, f : L→ L and δ ∈ uco(L). In the hypotheses
of Prop. 1 we have that:
1. If δ meet-uniform then R↑δ(f) = λx. K
∧
δ (x) ∨ f(x);
2. R↓δ(f) = λx. δ(x) ∧ f(x).
The above characterization says that the minimal revelation from above w.r.t. δ of f is
the function that associates with each x the least upper bound between f(x) and the
smallest element that preserves δ on x. Indeed, this corresponds to adding the minimal
amount of information to f(x) in order to make it preserve the property δ on x. An
analogous reasoning holds for the minimal revelation from below.
4 Modeling Concealment
In this section, we investigate the function transformers that maximally modify a func-
tion in order to hide/conceal a given property. The idea is to find the farthest functions
from f , on the lattice L → L, that lose a certain property ϕ, and these are character-
ized as the farthest functions having the same revelation transformer of f w.r.t ϕ. These
transformers are precisely the adjoints [14] of the revelation ones, which while trans-
forming, in order not to reach the top, keep the strong bind with the original function
consisting in having the same revelation transformer.
8 δ is meet uniform on x iff δ(∧{ y ∣∣ δ(x) = δ(y) }) = δ(x), δ is meet uniform if ∀x ∈ L we
have δ meet uniform on x.
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Definition 3 (Maximal concealment). Let L be a complete lattice, f : L → L and










g : L→ L ∣∣R↓ϕ(f) = R↓ϕ(g) }
These transformers are interesting when C↓ϕ(f) and C
↑
ϕ(f) have the same revelation
(from above or from below) of f , and this clearly is not always true. In particular, the
maximal concealments are defined as the adjoints of the revelation transformers and
these adjoint transformers do not always exists. Recall that an upper closure admits
adjoint, which is a lower closure [14], if it is meet-uniform [9], while, dually, a lower
closure admits adjoint, which is an upper closure, if it is join-uniform9. It is worth
noting, that uniformity is a local property, namely a function g may be uniform on a
particular input x, i.e., for meet-uniformity g(x) = g(∧{ y ∣∣g(x) = g(y) }), and fail
uniformity on other inputs. In this case we say that g is (meet)-uniform on x and w.r.t.
x we can find the adjoint, i.e.,
∧{
y
∣∣g(x) = g(y) }. Hence, we have that if R↑ϕ on a
function f is meet-uniform then C↓ϕ(f) is the minimum, namely it is an uco and behaves
as adjoint of R↑ϕ, and dually if R
↓
ϕ is join-uniform on f then C
↑
ϕ(f) is the maximum.
Theorem 3. Let L be a complete Boolean algebra10, ϕ ∈ uco(L). For each f : L→ L
satisfying the hypotheses of Prop. 1 we have that:
1. If ϕ is meet-uniform then R↑ϕ ∈ uco(L→ L) is meet-uniform on f ;
2. R↓ϕ ∈ lco(L→ L) is join-uniform on f .
Observe that if function f does not satisfy the hypotheses of Prop. 1 then, for instance,
R↑ϕ(f) = λx.>. In this case,R↑ϕ is not meet-uniform on f since the glb of the functions
gi having the same revelation R↑ϕ(gi) = λx.> may have a different revelation.
Example 2. Suppose L = ℘(N), f(X) =
{
x+ 1




∣∣gi = λX. { x+ i ∣∣x ∈ X } , i odd }, and suppose δ = Par char-
acterizing the parity of integers, for instance Par(X) = Even iff ∀x ∈ X. x even.
Then it is trivial to note that for each i, and for each X of even numbers, we have
that for all Y such that Par(Y ) = Par(X) = Even, Y 6⊆ gi(X) since Y must con-
tain only even numbers, while gi(X) contains only odd numbers. On the other hand,⋂
i gi(X) = ∅ ⊆ Par(X) since, for instance, gi({2, 4}) ∩ gi({6, 7}) = ∅.
The following result provides a characterization of the maximal concealment transform-
ers in terms of the kernel of the property to hide.
Proposition 2. Let L be a complete Boolean algebra, ϕ ∈ uco(L). For each f : L →
L satisfying the hypotheses of Prop. 1 we have that:
1. If ϕ is meet-uniform then C↓ϕ(f) = λx.
∨{
z
∣∣ z ≤ f(x), z ∧ K∧ϕ(x) = ⊥ };
2. C↑ϕ(f) = λx.
∧{
z
∣∣ z ≥ f(x), z ∨ ϕ(x) = > };
9 Join uniformity is the dual notion of meet uniformity.
10 A complete Boolean algebra is a complete complemented and distributive lattice [13].
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Hence, the maximal concealment from below w.r.t. property ϕ of f is the function
that associates with each element x the greatest element, smaller than f(x), that loses
any information about the property ϕ on x, namely the greatest element that is the
complement w.r.t. ⊥ of the smallest element that preserves ϕ on x (dually for C↑ϕ(f)).
These characterizations turn out to be particularly meaningful when interpreted on a
powerset domain ordered by set inclusion.
Corollary 1. Let D be a complete lattice, L = ℘(D) and ϕ ∈ uco(L). For each
f : L← L satisfying the hypotheses of Prop. 1
1. If ϕ is meet-uniform then C↓ϕ(f) = λX. f(X)r K∩ϕ(X);
2. C↑ϕ(f) = λX. f(X) ∪ (D r ϕ(X)).
Indeed, for any X ∈ ℘(D), C↓ϕ(f)(X) can be obtained by erasing from f(X) the
smallest set having the same property ϕ than X , namely the minimal information that
leads to property ϕ(X). On the other side, C↑ϕ(f)(X) can be obtained by adding to
f(X) the biggest element in D that does not share the same property ϕ(X), namely by
adding the maximal amount of obscurity to f(X) w.r.t. ϕ.
5 Characterizing property-driven obfuscations
In this section we discuss how by combining revelation and concealment transform-
ers we can characterize an obfuscation starting from the specification of the property
δ ∈ uco(℘(Σ∗)) to reveal and of the property ϕ ∈ uco(℘(Σ∗)) to conceal. The con-
cealment transformer provides an important understanding of what we have to add in
order to obfuscate a given property: it characterizes the set of all the possible compu-
tations that we have to add in order to gain confusion on the observation of ϕ. At this
point the revelation transformer allows us to refine this information by avoiding all the
computations that do not preserve a property δ.
Proposition 3. The maximal property-driven obfuscation strategy, concealing ϕ meet-
uniform and revealing δ, is Oδϕ(f) = λX. X ∪ (δ(X) ∩ (Σ∗ r K∩ϕ(X))) for f in the
hypotheses of Prop. 1,
Starting from the identity, we first lose the information concerning ϕ(X) by taking
those traces with a different ϕ property w.r.t. X , then we guarantee the preservation of
δ(X) by selecting only those traces which have the same δ property of X . Finally, we
add all the original traces in order to guarantee that the original semantics is preserved.
In order to guarantee the existence of the maximal property-driven obfuscation we have
the meet-uniformity hypothesis on the property to conceal. In general, properties may
also fail meet-uniformity, in this case the obfuscation strategy we obtain loses maximal-
ity and also unicity. Indeed, if ϕ is not meet-uniform, then it does not exist the minimal
set in Kϕ(X). However this is not a problem since we can choose any element on this
set, for instance ϕ(X) itself, which in general may not be minimal, but still allows to
obtain an obfuscation strategy. In particular, if we choose Y ∈ Kϕ(X) then Σ∗ r Y is
not maximal, but it still adds confusion on the property ϕ. In this case, we denote this
choice inside Kϕ(X) as Kˆϕ(X) and the corresponding concealment Cˆ. Note that, this
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weakening is important also for computational issues, indeed the Kϕ(X) can be com-
puted only for finite domains, while in general (as it happens for the real obfuscations)
it is easier to generate one element of this set, namely Kˆϕ(X).
Moreover, we can observe that the definition of Oδϕ provided in Proposition 3 is quite
strong in the context of code obfuscation not only for the meet-uniformity requirement
(that can be weakened) but also because it adds the whole semantics [[P ]] to the se-
mantics of the obfuscated program. This implies that the original semantics has to be
contained in the obfuscated program, which is a strong requirement since it is sufficient
to contain the abstract semantics δ([[P ]]). This observation is important also to partially
fill the gap between the proposed strategy and existing code obfuscations which trans-
form also traces of P , namely obfuscations such that [[tˆ(P )]] 6⊇ [[P ]]. The obfuscating
component of Oδϕ is the set we add to X , namely δ(X) ∩ (Σ∗ r K∩ϕ(X)), while the
preservation condition forces any obfuscated version ofX to stay inside Kδ(X). Hence,
we can provide the following weakened characterization of code obfuscations.
Proposition 4. Let ϕ, δ ∈ uco(℘(Σ∗)). Oˆδϕ(X) is a property-driven obfuscation of X
iff Oˆδϕ(X) ∈ Kδ(X)∩(℘(Σ∗)rKϕ(X)) iff Oˆδϕ(X) ∈ Kδ(X) ∧ Oˆδϕ(X) ⊆ Σ∗rKˆϕ(X).
If ϕ is meet-uniform then we take as Kˆϕ(X) precisely K
∩
ϕ(X).
Hence, in this case the maximal property-driven obfuscation is the maximal subset of
Kδ(X) contained inΣ
∗r Kˆϕ(X). Finally, the next result shows the relation between the
existence condition of property-driven obfuscations and the semantic code obfuscation
characterization provided in [8] (see Section 2). In particular, coherently with [8], a
property-driven obfuscator, concealing ϕ and revealing δ, exists iff δ does not imply ϕ.
Corollary 2. A property-driven obfuscator Oˆδϕ(X) exists, by Proposition 4, iff we have
Kδ(X) ∩ (℘(Σ∗)r Kϕ(X)) 6= ∅ iff ∃Y ∈ ℘(Σ∗). δ(Y ) 6⊆ ϕ(Y ).
Example 3. Let Sign(℘(Z)) = {>, 0+, 0, 0−,+,−,∅} be the property of signs. This
property is not meet-uniform, for instance Sign({1, 2}) = + = Sign({3, 4}) and the in-
tersection is such that Sign(∅) = ∅. Analogously, we can prove that its lift on ℘(Σ∗)11
is also not meet-uniform. Hence, in this case, we have to use Kˆ, and given X ∈ ℘(Σ∗),
for simplicity as KˆSign(X) we take Sign(X) ∈ KSign(X) obtaining so far a weakened ver-
sion Cˆ↑Sign of C
↑
Sign. Let I be the I/O property12. Let us consider, ϕ = Sign, δ = I and





3.while x > 0 do
4.y := y + 2;








3.while x > 0 do
4.y := y + 2;
5.x := x− 1
endw
6′.if x = 0 then y := y + 4;
6.output y;
7.end
11 Given X ∈ ℘(Σ∗) we define Sign(X) def= ∪ {σ ∈ Σ∗ | ∀i. σi ∈ Sign(
{
σ′i
∣∣σ′ ∈ X })},




∣∣∃σ′ ∈ X. σa = σ′a, σ` = σ′` }, where given σ ∈ Σ∗ we denote σ` the first
state of σ and with σa the last one, equal to the undefined value ⊥ if σ is infinite
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∣∣ I(Y ) = I([[P ]]) }
OˆISign([[P ]]) = [[P ]] ∪ (I([[P ]]) ∩
{
σ
∣∣σ /∈ Sign([[P ]]) })
Then a property-driven obfuscation OˆISign([[P ]]) has to be such that Oˆ
I
Sign([[P ]]) ∈ KI([[P ]])
and OˆISign([[P ]]) ⊆ Σ∗ r Sign(X). Hence, the semantics of the obfuscation must be a
set of traces such that the I/O behavior is precisely that of P , but which sign property
changes. Trivially we can prove that such a set always exists and therefore that the
hypothesis of Proposition 4 are satisfied. This means that we can make a program trans-
formation that during the computation changes the sign of the variable y, for instance,
without changing the final value. At this point any program whose semantics satisfies
these conditions may be considered as an obfuscation of P . For instance, consider tˆ(P )




∣∣∃n. σ ∈ 〈0+,⊥〉 → 〈0+,−〉 → 〈+, 0+〉 → 〈0,+〉 } 6= Sign([[P ]]).
We believe that it is not difficult to provide an intuition of how we can interpret well-
known code obfuscations as property-driven obfuscations whose detailed development
deserve further work. Consider for instance the following examples.
Consider again the example of CFG and opaque predicates introduced before. In this
case, by Proposition 4 a property-driven obfuscator is any semantics whose I/O ab-
straction, I, is the same as the one of the original program, but corresponding to a
different CFG, namely different G abstraction w.r.t. the original program. Namely, tˆ(P )
is a property-driven obfuscator if [[tˆ(P )]] ∈ KI([[P ]]) and [[tˆ(P )]] ⊆ Σ∗ r KˆG([[P ]]) (it
is easy to believe that G is not meet-uniform). It is clear that the precise obfuscation
algorithm will choose a particular program tˆ(P ) whose abstract I/O semantics is the
same as P but with a different CFG.
Consider Ex. 1 about slicing obfuscation. Then, [[obfuscated]] = OˆID([[original]]), and
we observe that OˆID([[original]]) ∈ KI([[original]]) and that OˆID([[original]]) ⊆ Σ∗ r
KˆD([[original]]). Namely, as explained before, it is a program whose semantics has the
same I/O abstraction of the original program, but whose program variable dependencies
are changed.
6 Future Work
We have proposed a property-driven characterization of code obfuscation obtained by
composing revelation and concealment transformers. By instantiating this characteriza-
tion to a specific program P we obtain a specification R↓δ(C
↑
ϕ([[P ]])) of the semantics of
the obfuscation of P . We plan to investigate the existence of this obfuscated program in
terms of the interplay between the two considered properties ϕ and δ in the semantics
of P . Our intuition is that it is possible to obfuscate P revealing ϕ while concealing δ
only if these properties are somehow independent in the semantics of P .
There exists another semantics-based notion of obfuscation [10] that specifies trans-
formation potency on the abstract program semantics, instead of on the abstraction of
11
the concrete semantics has we have done. We plan to study revelation and concealment
transformers also on this more general notion of semantic obfuscation.
From the theoretical point of view, this can be related with other property-driven
function transformers, such as the complete shells and cores [12], the incomplete trans-
formers [10], the transformers towards additivity [1], obtaining so far a framework for
property-driven transformers parametric on the property to guarantee.
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